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The Problems of Interdisciplinarity of generating within the American legal academy because it has not been sufficiently interdisciplinary, or-to be more precise-it has not been very thoughtful about interdisciplinarity. 9 At the same time, it has had less influence than it might have had with actual lawyers because it has seemed too interdisciplinary, in the sense of not having a lot to say about the aspect of law with which most lawyers are most concerned: doctrine. There is less of a paradox here than might appear. Law-and-literature scholarship has not questioned what the category "law" consists of and has thus tended inadvertently to reinforce the notion of law as autonomous.
This failing-if it is a failing-is not unusual in "law and" scholarship. Assessments of how legal academics could or should employ learning from other fields typically employ a strategy of compare-and-contrast in which the nature and aims of law are juxtaposed against those of the non-law field to evaluate whether the latter can be used appropriately in the service of the former.' 0 Because the comparisons tend to treat both "law" and the "and" discipline as bounded entities, they do not explicitly consider how the boundaries are drawn. As in the case of law and literature, law tends to be depicted as a more or less empty domain composed mainly of rules. For all of the collective success of the "law ands" in challenging the old-fashioned vision of law as rules, the individual "law ands" have not escaped the spell of Langdellian orthodoxy. More specifically, they have failed to fulfill the potential of interdisciplinary scholarship to examine how we categorize knowledge and why.
Before developing this critique in more detail, I state a separate critique that may be a helpful backdrop. This background critique is that the law-9. Proving that law and literature has not in fact generated the excitement it might have is difficult, for assessing the impact of ideas is tricky work. In America, we are fond of counting citations, see, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1540 REv. (1985 ; Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 751 (1996) , but it is not at all clear that qualitative effects are best evaluated by quantitative measures. Moreover, the pseudo-scientism of citation counting seems inconsistent with a movement committed to nonmechanical, nonreductionist views of law. If (putting aside obvious methodological problems of exactly what we ought to count, how we count it, and so on), we count nonetheless, the results are not very encouraging. To take but one example, in a recent Westlaw search of law reviews and journals, the term 'law and economics' appeared 6675 times; the term 'law and literature' appeared 1655 times. Search of Westlaw JLR database (June 1, 1998).
One of law and literature's principal figures, Robin West, has conceded that law and literature is a "marginal movement" as compared with law and economics. ROBIN WEST, CARING and-literature movement has tended to undermine itself from within. If there is a single movement here," it is certainly a very fractured one. The concerns of its separate strands are quite disparate. Any theme broad enough to tie all the strands together can be found and stated only at a level of abstraction so high as to threaten banality; such abstraction also undercuts what some within the movement regard as a fundamental commitment to particularity as opposed to grand theory. 2 This is a movement of many methodologies and conclusions. The multiplicity of approaches and concerns that leads some to see literature as a source of nearly endless possibilities may lead skeptics to dismiss law and literature as an empty vessel, a phrase devoid of content.
The interdisciplinarity critique and the background critique are not necessarily connected. The background critique basically describes a problem of internal fragmentation, of mixed and conflicting messages. The law-and-literature movement could be a great deal more unified and coherent than I argue it actually is and yet still fail to engage meaningfully the question of how and why disciplinary boundaries are being drawn in the way the movement currently draws them.
Still, the critiques may not be wholly unrelated. Each strand of the lawand-literature movement seeks to demonstrate that literature has something to offer law. The less attention that is paid to what law is, for purposes of this comparison, the easier it is to make the case for literature; that is, the less law already includes, the more obvious it is that it requires the supplementation of literature. Explicit recognition that the category "law" might be contingent or created would substantially complicate the argument. It seems no accident that a movement so invested in a vision of law as requiring enhancement from something "outside" should be 11. For arguments that there is a single movement, see, for example, GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 149-66 (1995) (providing a chapter on "the law and literature movement"); WEST, supra note 9, at 179 (" [It now makes some sense to speak of the law and literature movement as a recognizable discipline, or subspecialty with its own set of defining questions and tentative lines of analysis within the legal academy. 247, 255 (1985) (book review) (arguing that law and literature lacks the kind of "organized theoretical structure" of law and economics); iU. at 255-56 (arguing that because "there is no single well-understood and widely accepted theory of literature," nor "a unifying set of normative values" underlying literary interpretation, there are "serious questions about whether law and literature provides an adequate conceptual foundation to support a coherent body of scholarship"); cf. Thomas Morawetz, Ethics and Style: The Lessons of Literature for Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499 (1993) (book review) (suggesting that some scholars wishing to counteract the perception that "the discipline of law and literature is actually the intersection of several distinct and barely overlapping concerns" have sought "to validate the field by identifying a significant core").
12. somewhat careless in its consideration of the boundaries of "law" as a discipline. Both critiques, then, point to a single problem: By treating law's boundaries as both necessary and natural, the law-and-literature movement seems to beg questions it is ostensibly committed to answering, such as whether it makes sense to use the "outside" discipline of literature as a tool to examine what is or could be "inside" law-and, more importantly, how we define what is "internal" and "external" to law as a discipline.
I. THE ELUSIVE CONNECTION BETWEEN LrrERATuRE AND LAW Unlike college courses, in which professors tend to assign multiple books and have a supplemental list of "suggested" readings to boot, in many law school courses, especially in the first year, only one book is assigned. When I entered law school, I was shocked to learn that the sole book consisted mainly of cases. One learned law, it seemed, by reading law. Only law. One did not read about law. One read the law itself. No more, apparently, was needed.
From the perspective of at least some within the law-and-literature movement, this "only law" approach is misguided. The movement's proponents (whom I shall call hereinafter "law-and-lits") argue that law students, legal academics, and even practicing lawyers should also read literature. But for what purpose should they read literature? What is it that literature can add? Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the answer to this question. Rather, the movement divides into three separate strands. 13 
A. Divisions Within Law and Literature: Three Strands
Some law-and-lits, whom I shall call "humanist" law-and-lits, argue that lawyers should read literature. Here are some typical claims:
[L]iterary works typically invite their readers to put themselves in the place of people of many different kinds and to take on their experiences.... [T]hey promote identification and sympathy ....
... One may be told many things about people in one's own society and yet keep that knowledge at a distance. Literary works that promote identification and emotional reaction cut through 13 . Any characterization of the movement's divisions is to some extent arbitrary. For a slightly different description of the "genres" of law and literature, see Guyora Binder, The Lawas-Literature Trope, in LAW AND LrrERATURE, supra note 8 (manuscript at 7). As I will argue, a more conventional approach divides the movement into "law in literature" and "law as literature." See infra text accompanying notes 65-67. Several leading law-and-literature scholars organize their discussion around the three strands identified in the text, although they have not used the identical labels. See, e.g., MINDA, supra note 11, at 153; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE 5-6 (rev. ed. 1998); VEST, supra note 9, at 179.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1059 those self-protective stratagems, requiring us to see and to respond to many things that may be difficult to confront .... ,4
[L]iterature projects the abstract into the concrete." 5 Literature trains people in the reflection, consciousness, choice, and responsibility that make up the ability to engage in moral decisionmaking. It does so by presenting artificial, but concrete, universes in which premises may be worked out in conditions conducive to empathy but ambiguous enough to allow for the formation of moral judgment. 6 Notice that while the claims have slightly different emphases, the basic argument is the same: Literature is needed to humanize lawyers. Borrowing from earlier work, 7 I will call this the "moral uplift" theme of the law-andliterature movement. It has several components: First, lawyers need to know more about human nature-especially about people different from themselves-than they can learn on their own, and literature can be a source of this knowledge. 3 Second, lawyers tend to rely excessively on abstract reason over forms of understanding that are emotional, intuitive, and concrete, and literature can help correct this imbalance. 9 Third, lawyers require training in making moral judgments, and literature can be a part of the necessary moral education. 2 "
While humanist law-and-lits argue that lawyers should read literature, others, whom I shall call "hermeneutic" law-and-lits, argue that lawyers am convinced that literature is a better medium for lawyers than is, say, moral philosophy, from which to learn about rightness. It delights as it instructs. It places the inquiry on virtue into a dynamic framework and allows the reader to reason inductively from the cases described to her own experience and thoughts.").
should read literary theory. The latter group seeks to apply to law interpretive methodologies borrowed from literary studies. The reason is simple. To the extent that law is embodied in texts-such as cases, statutes, contracts, orders-those texts must be read and interpreted. 21 Literary scholars have concerned themselves with problems of interpretation for a very long time, and it seems that theories and methods developed in the context of literary texts could be applied to legal texts as well.
2 2 Why, after all, reinvent the interpretation wheel?
Notice that the project of applying to law interpretive theories developed in departments of English or comparative literature does not require that one actually read any poems, novels, or plays-in short, any literature. While a particular interpretive methodology might have been developed in the context, say, of reading Hamlet, what makes it a methodology (as opposed to an interesting way to read Hamlet) is that it can be applied to other texts as well. So one need not read the play, but only the methodology. Hermeneutic law-and-lits thus do not argue that lawyers need to read literature. Indeed, besides looking beyond legal materials to sources from the humanities, the interpretive project of hermeneutic lawand-lit has very little connection to the moral uplift project of humanist lawand-lit. The two strands of law-and-lit are neither reading the same works nor asking the same questions. ' Further splintering this already very fractured movement is yet another set of writings that has come to be associated with law and literature: writings taking up the role of narrative or storytelling in law. 24 human nature, the role of the emotions in human thinking, and moral decisionmaking. Indeed, a medicine and literature movement has grown up around just these claims. ' Even assuming both that moral uplift is worthwhile and that literature can provide it, there is a question about which books, exactly, should be read. The most salient version of this question concerns the construction of the "canon." 2 9 The arguments that the traditional canon is limited are (I hope) too well developed to require recapitulation here. 30 Suffice it to say that the more the canon excludes the voices of outsiders and women, the less enriching and emancipatory the cross of literature with law is likely to be. 31 Yet there is another problem of selection, even within the existing canon. Why read one book rather than another? The original humanist lawand-lits at least could narrow the field somewhat, as they argued that lawyers should read books that were about law in some sense-containing a trial scene, portraying "typical traits of a lawyer or judge," delineating the prosecution and punishment of a crime, or having a plot into which some point of law entered. 32 31. Robin West discusses the effects on law of the limitations of the literary canon:
The literary canon will reflect the moral sensibilities of the same elite whose interests are reflected and served by law. Those moral sensibilities might, indeed, be in rebellion against the legal and political order of the day. But they are nevertheless the sensibilities of elites. The voices, experiences, and perspectives of outsiders will only rarely infiltrate, and a form of critique that depends upon the canon for its critical insights will reflect that limitation. WEST, supra note 9, at 195. For a defense of the traditional canon, see WEISBERG, supra note 7, at 117- The problem of apparently random selection is aggravated by the diversity of styles and attitudes with which humanist law-and-lits read. Perhaps this diversity was inevitable, as legal scholars seem to have turned to literary studies just when there was the least consensus within the latter field about how to read. 39 Whatever the reason, the result is unquestionable: One humanist law-and-lit might read in a New Critical style, 4 " while another may be concerned with historical context, 4 1 and still another might be an intentionalist. 42 Ironically, for all the apparent diversity, there is a certain sameness to the structure of humanist law-and-lit writing. Such scholarship often seems to oscillate between the poles of high generality and exacting specificity, offering large and abstract claims, and supporting them with closely detailed readings of selected texts. The typical essay 43 begins with an assertion about the connection between literature and law-a statement, usually, of what literature can teach lawyers. 44 It then proffers a work of 38. Judge Posner has explicitly repudiated this position, arguing that only literature that has withstood the test of time and survived in the literary "marketplace" is capable of teaching valuable lessons. POSNER, supra note 13, at 11-23.
Robert Weisberg notes:
[The] turn to literature for renewal is ironic, since ... it is literature itself whose internal troubles seem to best reflect the various types of alienation, malaise, and disbelief which are said to distress modem culture. In that regard, it may be more appropriate to look to literature as a model of postmodernist confusion than as a cure literature that will demonstrate the connection and teach the lesson 4 There follows a summary of the plot and, where appropriate, the characters. 46 Then comes the most difficult step, as the message of the literary work for law is drawn out. 47 Here we find a close examination of a particular passage or turn of the plot and what that passage or turn "means., 48 From the particular, we move back to the general, where-to no one's surprise-we find that the promised connection has been made, the lesson taught.
49
Is it true that "Franz Kafka's fictional works on the nature of law dramatize a dark underside of [Richard] Posner's argument that the fact of consent morally legitimates our legal, social, and personal worlds" ?. 90 Is it correct that, in Song of Myself, Walt Whitman "claims that the light of the poetic imagination is a crucial agent of democratic equality for.., excluded people, since only that imagination will get the facts of their lives fight" ?" Is "the lesson of The Scarlet Letter" that "once the seriousness of the decision to bear or beget a child is recognized, excluding women from citizenship by denying them this freedom is wrong" ?52 Is Aeschylus' Oresteia trilogy "fundamentally a story about the emergence of law" ? These assertions may or may not be true. Certainly they are not selfevidently true. The problem is not that lawyers and legal scholars are incapable of informed, sensitive readings of important literary works; interpretation of literary works need not be the exclusive province of literary scholars. But literary scholars rarely agree among themselves on anything like a single correct interpretation of an important creative work. 54 I have presented the conclusory interpretations above in a rather harsh, decontextualized light, but a disconcerting aspect of the moral uplift project is that it almost demands that works of literature be read, like fables, for their "message." The certainty with which legal scholars assert what are actually quite contestable readings is, thus, understandable, but still incongruous. Not only do the conclusions impart an air of closure that seems inappropriate to the complexity of the works at issue, but the certainty with which they are proposed seems at odds with the inquiring spirit alleged to animate the turn to literature in the first place.
And just to ice the cake, humanist law-and-lits cannot agree over the substance of these readings. While humanist law-and-lits agree that it is important to look at law through the lens of literature, this turns out to be a very superficial commonality, for what they see through the lens is almost unrecognizably different. [Vol.
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The Problems of Interdisciplinarity methodologies has mushroomed within English and comparative literature departments over the past ten to twenty years, so it is not surprising that hermeneutic law-and-lits are easily as divided among themselves as humanist law-and-lits. The preeminent issue for hermeneutic law-and-lits has been power: Who or what "controls" the meaning of a text-the author, the reader, the words of the text, conventions of reading? Beyond a tendency to approach this issue by focusing on a single legal text, the U.S. Constitution, the hermeneutic law-and-lits have found little on which to agree. Intentionalists clash with deconstructionists on one side and textualists on the other.' Meanwhile, other scholars enter the argument only to assert that nothing at all turns on the outcome, 6 1 while still others have made the opposite point: that too much turns on the outcome of real legal cases to make the analogy to literary interpretation apt. 6 " Finally, law-and-narrative scholarship itself has three strands, one focusing on the strategic use of storytelling as a persuasive technique, the second focusing on the evidentiary use bf storytelling to supply information about how the law actually functions in real-world settings, and the third focusing on how multiple inconsistent stories might accurately be told of the same event and raising questions about the sustainability of the legal vision of truth as univocal. 63 As is true within both humanist and hermeneutic law-and-lit, the three strands of law and narrative scholarship often conflict with one another. Evidentiary storytelling, for example, is meant to show something true, but previously unnoticed, about the world, whereas the telling of multiple stories is meant to challenge the idea of objective truth. 6 ' C. Is There a "Movement" Here?
Much of the writing about law and literature has more or less taken for granted that there is a law-and-literature movement and progressed quickly into discussions of its basic divisions into "law in literature" and "law as literature." 65 To be sure, "law and literature" classes are being taught at a not insignificant number of American law schools, 66 and a reasonably high number of scholarly works have focused on various aspects of law and literature. 67 But mere interest in law and literature does not a movement make.
Does it matter that the strands of the law-and-literature movement are all to some extent internally divided and that the three strands connect to each other so loosely? Certainly it has been argued that the "interdisciplinary eclecticism" 68 of law-and-humanities scholarship is itself a good, fostering creativity and experimentation. Yet the less attractive possibility is that what some see as creative diversity others will see as methodological confusion. In the world of law and literature, as we have seen, it is not uncommon for different scholars to find very different messages in the works they read. Again, perhaps it is good that there is such sharp divergence among scholars, for it suggests that literature is a rich and complex source, capable of multiple interpretations and thereby provocative of dialogue. But, to put things in the worst possible light, perhaps the divergence reveals that legal scholars can find just about anything in literature-hope, despair, community, alienation-and that what they do find is more or less a function of what they were looking for initially.
Some will argue that, to this point, I have been highly unfair to the lawand-literature movement, emphasizing its worst problems and using as examples its most exaggerated claims. I have, indeed, given scant attention to works that, without making particularly grand assertions about the power of literature to transform law, nonetheless use literary techniques to analyze, for example, the generally unacknowledged rhetorical structure of judicial opinions. 69 Nor have I described articles that employ fictional works (or characters from those works) as heuristic types that provide rich, nuanced, and yet shorthand descriptions of professional identities and 65. The former is generally the focus of what I have called the humanist law-and-lits, while the latter is generally the focus of the hermeneutic law-and-lits. The distinction, however, has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Ayer, supra note 11, at 1585 (noting four "disparate topics" that pass for "law and literature"); Morawetz, supra note 11, at 497-99 (discussing four strands of lav and literature); see also supra note 13 (arguing that any description of the divisions within law and literature will be to a certain extent arbitrary). dilemmas. 7 " I have said little about creative and enlightening juxtapositions of literary and legal treatment of concepts such as a "person" 7 1 or "property." 72 Nor have I touched on the connections between law and literature and other movements such as lav and feminism. 73 I have not, in short, covered every aspect of work in law and literature, nor have I presented the movement in its best possible light. 74 These choices have been deliberate. My project here is not to praise law and literature, but to try to explain why efforts to use literature in legal contexts-many of which are praiseworthy indeed-have had, relatively speaking, so little impact. For this project, it is important to look at lawand-literature scholarship with a cynic's eye. Taking a cynical view of the divergent readings that seem possible-all held seriously and confidently, all tending in different directions-it is not surprising that many remain skeptical about literature's potential as a source of enlightenment for law.
II. LAW, LrERATURE, AND INTERDISCiPLiNARITY

A. The Legal Academy, Interdisciplinarity, and Law and Literature
At this point it is probably worth reflecting for a moment about style and tone. Having argued that there may not actually be a law-and-literature movement, it seems odd to make claims about what "law and literature" or "law-and-literature scholarship" has or has not done. The obvious alternative is to speak very particularly of individual authors, focusing on the nuances of each's work. The risk here, of course, is descent into the ad hominem-a risk that, alas, has all too often been realized! 5 Since I do not wish to write in these terms, I will assume that, notwithstanding 70 divergences among the humanist, hermeneutic, and narrative strands of law and literature, it nonetheless makes sense to think about something that might be called the "enterprise" of law and literature. This enterprise, most broadly conceived, is about assessing the connections between two fields often thought to be different. There is a kind of standard story about this enterprise. 6 Until the Civil War, this story goes, the man of law in the United States (there were, of course, no women lawyers) was also a man of letters. But by about 1870, when Christopher Columbus Langdell became dean of Harvard Law School, law began to be conceptualized as a science rather than an art, a specialized professional discipline characterized by its own logic, methodology, and subject matter. Once law became an independent field, literature was no longer a part of legal education, nor was it a part of lawyers' everyday competence. Putting this point in a slightly different way, there was no "and" to law in its Langdellian form; law was autonomous. Indeed, this lack of an "and" was what made law law. 77 This vision of law as autonomous has been resisted almost from the start. Early in the twentieth century, legal "realists" began to question whether legal principles alone could dictate or explain outcomes, while legal "progressives" argued that law was not an autonomous system of norms, but rather "an instrument for the conscious pursuit of social welfare," requiring lawyers to understand not just legal but also social facts and to act as social engineers. 78 Despite this resistance, however, the notion of law as an independent, self-sustaining field remained powerful.
Oddly, one marker of this power is the development of various "law ands" that offer other areas of knowledge and alternative methodologies to I am not a historian, and therefore I cannot directly attest to the accuracy of this story, but I believe it to be true. However this may be, there is no doubting the story's power in structuring accounts of the place of law and literature in the intellectual and social history of the legal profession. See, e.g., Hirshman, supra note 16, at 197-98 (situating the "resurgence of the profession's interest in literary, imaginative representation" in the context of the historical developments described by Ferguson and Stevens); Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 513-14 (1991) (explaining that the law-andliterature movement "attempts to reconnect disciplines that have a history of connections"); WEST, supra note 9, at 182-83 (describing some parts of the contemporary law-and-literature movement as attempts to "resurrect for the modem sensibility" a 19th-century ideal of what it means to be a good lawyer).
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[Vol. 108: 1059 supplement, enrich, or correct law. In this conceptual scheme, literature is one of many rich sources that provide information about and perspective on law, and law and literature is the interdisciplinary endeavor by which these two particular fields are used to enhance each other. That is, law and literature is but one of several "interdisciplines" involving law. And so it would seem that the law-and-literature enterprise offers the opportunity to explore questions about the definition of disciplinary boundaries and, indeed, about the notion of interdisciplinarity generally.
To examine law and literature as an instance of interdisciplinarity, it is helpful to focus less on particular substantive claims about the ways in which law is the same as or different from literature, and more on the way in which claims about law and literature are structured. Law-and-literature scholars repeatedly ask questions in something like the following form: "How is law like (or unlike) literature?" or "What is it that literature has to say to law?" 79 The answers, predictably, tend to follow the form of the questions, asserting that "literature is (not) like law in these (enumerated) ways"; or that "literature is (not) useful to law in these (enumerated) senses"; or that "(un)like law, literature... .,, " Both the questions and the answers seem to posit that law and literature are separate disciplinary domains that either do or do not meaningfully connect to one another. That is, there is "literature" and there is "law," and they are, apparently, separate realms that can be like or unlike, useful or not useful to one another.
At the same time, however, an important component of law-andliterature scholarship is devoted to establishing whether law and literature are in fact appropriately considered two enterprises (the view, for example, of Richard Posner" 1 ) or one (the view, most notably, of James Boyd White 2 ). This debate thus calls into question what much ordinary law-andliterature scholarship assumes. One would think, then, that as a whole the law-and-literature enterprise would be very thoughtful about the delineation-or dare I say, the construction-of disciplinary boundaries. Ongoing debates arising in other "law ands" in the United States would make such thoughtfulness very timely. These debates tend to be structured by the same compare-and-contrast strategy used to assess law's (un)likeness to literature. The nature and aims of "law" are juxtaposed against those of, say, philosophy or history 83 to ascertain whether the methods of the latter can be used in the service of law' So, for example, it has been asserted that historians "favor context, change, and explanation," while authors of lawyers' legal history "value text, continuity, and prescription." 85 Similarly, it has been argued that, within philosophy, "authority" is "earned" by having "garner[ed] support through centuries of reasoned debate and intellectual assessment," while legal authority is "institutional," resting on "the mere fact that a case has been decided one way rather than another, or that a judge has made a particular pronouncement." 8 6 The comparisons depict each of the contrasted disciplines as separate, having its own "internal" conventions and The heart of literary discourse is self-consciousness of the language itself: of its social and cultural implications, of its over-commitment and dead spots....
[L]iterary texts are characteristically marked by a tension between languages (such as that between the concrete and the abstract); the effect is to qualify each language while using it. The art-it is the art of "integration"-lies in writing two ways at once. In this respect law is naturally literary, for the legal case as we normally think of it can be neither an exercise in abstract analysis nor the presentation of mere particulars, but requires the interaction of both modes of discourse; similarly, it requires attention to the case not from one point of view or another-the plaintiff s or the defendant's-but from both at once. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra, at 40. 84. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 1630-41 (describing how philosophy can be useful in legal education).
85. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 180 (1996) . 86. Collier, supra note 10, at 220.
objectives, but almost no one is terribly clear about how these boundaries are drawn. Indeed, the less attention given the boundaries, the better; acknowledging that sometimes lawyers are sensitive to context (even in their use of history) or that some legal authority is respected precisely because its reasoning has stood up over time would undermine substantially the rhetorical force of the comparisons. Whatever the reason, most assessments of "ands" other than literature assume that disciplines have boundaries and are highly critical of how the boundaries are treated. The debates, most noisily typified by controversy over the use of history by those advocating civic republican interpretations of constitutional theory, 88 have been characterized by charges that legal scholars "misuse" or "abuse" other disciplines, 9 that their analyses lack "rigor" or are "sub-standard," 9 and that they use non-law theories as "decoration" to lend spurious authority to ideas that should stand, or fall, on their own. 9 1 These charges have led in turn to suggestions that interdisciplinarity in law is always merely apparent, 9 2 that, conversely, the very idea of a disciplinary perspective or concept has become unintelligible, 9 3 and that attempts at interdisciplinarity only create new, unrecognized disciplines. 94 Echoes of these controversies may occasionally and faintly be heard in writing about law and literature. Here and there one comes across the injunction not to read literature for political or ethical purposes, but rather REV. 521, 542 ("The defining feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice; ... it is this feature that distinguishes it from other academic fields."); see also Wetlaufer, supra note 54, at 1566, 1572 ("One could fairly say that the primary purpose of conventional legal scholarship is to generate usable solutions to problems that existwithin the legal arena"; lawyers will therefore be reluctant to consult disciplines that do not "offer the kinds of determinate, exclusive answer that the business of 'deciding' requires").
88. For a summary of the critiques of republican historiography, 92. See Tushnet, supra note 91, at 934-35 ("Law-office history is a legal practice, not a historical one. The criteria for evaluating it, for determining what is a successful performance, must be drawn from legal practice rather than from historical practice. I believe the same conclusion can be drawn about interdisciplinary legal scholarship generally." (emphasis added)). [Vol. 108: 1059 "for itself" 9 or by reference to "aesthetic" criteria. 96 On the whole, however, discussions of the relation of law to literature seem remarkably disconnected from the larger debate about interdisciplinarity in law.
This disconnection is somewhat ironic because the law-and-literature endeavor is typical of other "law ands" in its remarkable lack of selfconsciousness about the use of the term "law," especially as that term is contrasted to the equally un-self-consciously employed term "literature" ("history," "philosophy," etc.). One example of this phenomenon is the argument, made as part of the moral uplift project of humanist law-and-lit, that literature is a source of values otherwise missing from the law. 97 This argument rests on a vision of law as inherently empty or ignorant of moral values-values that must be supplied from "outside" of law. This vision is sustained by the initial story of law's development, in which law distinguished itself as a profession by excluding literary and philosophical concerns; once law was conceptualized as analytical, scientific and practical, the literary and philosophical concerns that were once part of law could only reappear if they were yanked back "in. 96. POSNER, supra note 13, at 306, 329; see also Miller, supra note 11, at 261 (questioning whether James Boyd White's use of fields of law and literature is "undisciplined").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20; see also Heald, supra note 44, at 3-4 ("Legal language often obscures the value-laden nature of legal choices. In fact, law talk is seldom concerned with overfly separating good from bad." But "fiction is an undeniably rich collection of studies in the appropriateness of human action." Thus, literature "may be a unique repository for information capable of enriching legal decision making."); Hirshman, supra note 16, at 179 (" Since... judging involves and will continue to involve judgements based on moral principles, how can society generally, and educators in particular, produce judges of the appropriate moral character and habits of mind to formulate such principles? The answer, I suggest, is implicit in the return of law to the humanities after its long and uneasy sojourn in the realm of science ... " ).
98. See William H. Page, The Place of Law and Literature, 39 VAND. L. REV. 391, 415 (1986) (book review) ("The modem field of law and literature is, paradoxically, a product of the breakdown of the configuration of law and literature. When law and literature were considered coordinate disciplines, united by their consonance with universal principles ... by definition there was no need for an interdisciplinary field of study."). I by no means wish to suggest that the story of law's development as a separate, nonliterary discipline is false. See supra note 76. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is, somewhere, an account of the development of law in the United States that is not a story. See Baron & Epstein, supra note 64, at 171-73 (describing the position that all arguments and accounts proceed from some nonneutral framework and, in this sense, are all "stories"). In employing the professionalization story described in the text, law-and-lits justifiably relied on the best available historical accounts of the rise of law as a professionaccounts that have not, to my knowledge, been seriously challenged.
On the other hand, there is no denying the professionalization story's utility in demonstrating the need for an "and" to supplement law. Moreover, law-and-lits have tended to present and utilize the professionalization story in a rather fiat and simplified way that emphasizes what was lost when law separated from the humanities in the 19th century. The more unliterary, unphilosophical, and technical the law is understood to be, the more sense it makes to reach out toward the moderating and enriching resources of non-law disciplines such as literature.
rule-governed law and nuanced, emotional, complex literature. 99 Such contrasts rely on---even as they entrench-a fairly conventional vision of law as a domain empty of anything other than rules, inhabited solely by unimaginative rule technicians."' These characterizations have, of course, been questioned. It has been noted, for example, that there are plenty of emotions, values, and general human messiness already within the law, as any sensitive reading of the facts of cases proves. 1 ' Robert Weisberg has made this point eloquently:
It is obviously desirable that law should be informed by the voice of the concrete, the particular, the empathetic, the passionate. But to make this point about legal discourse hardly should require recurrence to the great works of the Humanities.... Lawyers or law students are or should be perfectly aware even from conventional case analysis that human pain underlies doctrinal abstraction, that the general rules of common law doctrine live in tension with and are often undone by the particular stories of parties to the case. 0 2
Critiques like Weisberg's suggest that the contrasts between law and literature are complex, but they do not suggest that there are no meaningful contrasts. More importantly, they do not articulate explicitly-beyond assertions that law can be moral, sensitive to values, and so forth-what understanding of law should be used in drawing the contrasts.
Things are not much better on the hermeneutic or narrative side. The suggestions that law is like literature in being textual, or that law is inherently narrative in structure or content, seemed to auger a reconsideration of the divisions between the disciplines. The promised reconsideration, however, has often been rather thin. On the hermeneutic side, the law-and-literature categories reasserted themselves most visibly in 
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100. On the construction of law as a place filled almost entirely by rules, see Baron, supra note 10 (manuscript at 3-4). As I explain below, the boundaries of this domain are in no sense natural or "real," and, indeed, they may be constructed by the very contrasts that are offered for purposes of challenging them. debates over whether law's textuality is different from literature's, especially insofar as-as many have argued-interpretations of legal texts invoke coercive state power, while interpretations of literary texts do not 3 On the narrative side, claims that law is itself a narrative coexist with claims that law is not narrative enough; that stories, which employ the particular, the emotional, the human, are needed to counteract the abstraction and pseudo-objectivity of law." 4 The latter claims reinscribe a divide between storytelling and legal analysis, with the former correcting and, in the eyes of some, challenging the latter. 0 5
The specifics of these claims, like the claims of humanist law-and-lit, have been disputed. Some have argued that interpretation outside legal settings also involves the imposition of significant coercive power and so is similar to interpretation in law, 1 1 6 while others, continuing to insist that legal interpretation is coercive in a way that literary interpretation is not, have downplayed the importance of that distinction. 7 Critics of narrative law and literature have questioned "the premise that narrative concreteness by itself is some sort of guarantee of intellectual integrity or moral virtue," 03 and also whether, even if it is, particularity alone is capable of transforming law. 0 9 Again, these critiques suggest that contrasts between the textuality or narrativity of law and literature should not be drawn simplistically, but they do not suggest that there are no useful contrasts. And again, they largely leave unexamined how "law" should be defined in drawing those contrasts.
The less anyone discusses what "law" is for purposes of comparing law to literature, the easier it is to think of law in fairly stereotypical terms drawn from the standard story about law's development as an independent, nonhumanistic discipline. As depicted by the stereotype, law is instrumental, analytic, rational, nonemotional, technical, mechanical, and-103. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 236 ("A poet tries to create a work of art, a thing of beauty and pleasure.... A legislature is trying to give commands .... "); Cover, supra note 62, at 1601 (" [Ljegal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the different stakes involved in literary and legal interpretation).
104. For a summary of these themes of the legal storytelling movement, see Jane B. Baron, above all-doctrinal. It is a technological science or craft, a science perhaps not as completely autonomous as Langdell suggested at the end of the nineteenth century, but relatively autonomous nonetheless. 1 This depiction of law as autonomous paradoxically reappears even in approaches that, instead of contrasting law to literature, treat law as a form of literature. This is most famously the approach of James Boyd White, who has argued that "the life of the law is ... a life of art, the art of making meaning in language with others." ' The "central concern" of this life, White argues, is "the kind of relations that we establish with our inherited culture and with each other when we speak its language."' 12 Poetry, philosophy, and law are but specific instances of the general "cultural and ethical activity of making meaning in relation to others." 113 This view of law as literary 1 in character simply renders law autonomous in a different way. Law does not require supplementation by anything "outside" of itself, because-given the level of abstraction at which the process of doing law is described-nearly everything that could be outside is actually already "inside" law. Law, though broadened, remains a self-enclosed discipline. Indeed, the broader and more "integrated" ' " law is, the less problematic its self-enclosure comes to seem.
The tendency in these analyses to treat law as autonomous makes it difficult to assess the possibilities for connecting law with other disciplines. Assessing connections requires understanding what lies on either side of the "and" bridge, but this is precisely the terrain that is not being carefully mapped. We cannot determine the significance of literature for law if we uncritically define literature as simply everything law is not," 6 and the same is true if-as seems to be the case-the law-and-literature enterprise 110 . On Langdell's vision of law's autonomy, see sources cited supra note 77. If law-and-lits truly believed law to be inherently dehumanized or morally dessicated, there would be no point in calling for the enriching supplementation of literature. Logically, then, the law-and-lits would seem to be arguing not that law is necessarily autonomous, only that it has (for contingent historical reasons) become an entity of which Langdell would very much approve. On the other hand, the "law" to which "literature" is contrasted is never the more humanized, moral, emotionally sensitive institution it is apparently capable of becoming. For comparative and rhetorical purposes, "law" becomes mere rules. As I suggest below, the more law is described in doctrinalist terms, the harder it may be to (re)envision or (re)create it as anything else. continues to describe law as either everything literature is not or everything literature already is.
I do not mean to call here for a new or different set of boundaries; quite the contrary. Fruitful exploration of interdisciplinarity in law and literature does not require the delineation of the "true" and "real" boundaries between law and literature. It cannot, for precisely the reason that "law" and "literature" are not natural categories describing disciplines that are just there, preexisting and predefined. Our understanding of the categories may be as much a product of our attempts to compare and contrast them as of any quality that they have apart from the context of those contrasts. And the interesting question is not whether any particular definition of the categories is true, but what it might tell us about our aspirations for law and for the place of law in our culture.
It is in this light that the curious reaffirmance of law's autonomy seems most significant. Locating emotion and empathy outside law and inside literature, as so much humanist law and literature has done, suggests an unacknowledged investment in exactly that vision of cold, mechanical, dehumanized law that literature is supposed to combat. Similarly, locating interpretive power inside law and outside literature, as so much hermeneutic law and literature has done, suggests an attachment to exactly that vision of law as uniquely authoritative that attention to textuality is meant to put in question. These investments and attachments are of great cultural interest because they implicate questions of what we want or can envision law to be, of how we see the role of law as distinct-and we seem to want it to be distinct-from other social institutions. But these questions are, alas, not the ones the law-and-literature enterprise has considered.
In summary, what has kept law and literature, and "law and" more generally, from having the impact that they otherwise might have had in the legal academy has been insufficient thoughtfulness about interdisciplinarity. Like other "law ands," the law-and-literature enterprise purports to connect two disciplinary domains, but it has not questioned how those domains are defined and bounded. It has thus missed opportunities to raise and address important questions that would seem central to the "law and" project, that is, questions about how we distinguish "legal" from other sorts of knowledge and about our cultural investment in viewing law as an autonomous discipline.
B. Law, Literature, and Lawyers
Law and literature may not in fact be significantly interdisciplinary in the senses I have explained. But to practicing lawyers, law and literature appears all too interdisciplinary in the sense of being law admixed with something else that is clearly not law. If law is autonomous in the ways in which law-and-literature scholars inadvertently suggest, that is, if practicing law consists of the dry and technical manipulation of rules, then of what relevance is literature (or anything else) to lawyers?
American lawyers' enchantment with doctrine is evident on many fronts. It is a prominent theme in recent debates over whether the legal academy has lost touch with and become irrelevant to the real world of practice. In these debates, the world of practice is almost always defined as the world of doctrine." 7 Further evidence of the profession's fixation on rules comes from law-and-society scholars, who have tried to assess why empiricism has made so little headway in American legal education. These scholars have concluded that the answer lies in the extent to which lawyers and even law professors see "the main business of doing law" as "doing rules." 118 There are some noteworthy ironies to practitioners' views of law and literature as irrelevant. From the start, proponents of law and literature have argued that literature is important precisely because its lessons are practical. As early as 1908, for example, Wigmore argued that lawyers should read legal novels because "the lawyer must know human nature." And, Wigmore asserted, "for this learning... he must go to fiction, which is the gallery of life's portraits." 119 Narrative law-and-lits have argued for storytelling in similarly instrumental terms. Lawyers must persuade, the narrativists point out, and one of the most effective forms of persuasion is storytelling; therefore, they argue, effective lawyers must learn to be effective tellers of tales."12 Finally, the theories offered by hermeneutic law-and-lits can be seen as useful "strategies" for a task lawyers are regularly called upon to perform: the interpretation of writings such as statutes and documents.1 2 , Why is it that lawyers do not believe that these very practical aspects of literature relate to what they do? One possibility is that lawyers and lawand-lits are talking past each other, failing to engage on the issue of what "practical" lawyering is. This problem connects to a second irony, which is that law-and-literature scholarship may reinforce lawyers' narrow vision of practice as rules even as it seeks to challenge and expand that vision. Although the law-and-literature enterprise laments the dry doctrinalism of law, it repeatedly depicts currently practiced law as basically the application of rules. Such depictions, again parasitic on the standard story of the rise of law as an independent discipline, may actually help construct exactly the doctrinalist practices they are meant to disrupt. Cause and effect here is obviously complicated, but it may be that lawyers can only be told a certain number of times that what they are doing, however misguidedly, is mechanically applying rules before they come to believe that applying rules is essential to the practice of law. Indeed, the more lawyers adopt this view, the more difficult it may be to convince them that there is "practical" value to anything else.
II. CONCLUSION: "LAW AND" INSIDE OUT
What is "inside" law and what is "outside"? This is an essential question for all "law and" endeavors, for it is only what law does not already include that needs to be added. The idea of "law and" almost requires "law and" scholars generally, and law-and-literature scholars particularly, to treat law as a bounded entity, an independent domain. It is only if there is a divide between law and other disciplines that law can be connected to those disciplines through some sort of "and" relationship. Thus, the independence of law from other disciplines is what creates the possibility of interdisciplinarity.
The possibility of an "and" bridge between law and other disciplines has been, to some, a source of great hope. Each "law and" movement holds out a promise to bring new light to bear on old legal questions in ways that will, the claims variously assert, promote social justice, force a rethinking of objectivity, humanize legal practitioners, add moral or historical dimensions to jurisprudence, and so forth. Law and literature, in all its diverse and perhaps inconsistent strands, is no exception. Literature and literary methods will, it has been argued, enrich, instruct, enlighten, and correct law.
But what is this "law" entity that literature will supplement? In a move characteristic of "law and" work, much law-and-literature scholarship elides this question altogether, relying sometimes tacitly and sometimes explicitly on a standard story of how law developed as a distinct and expert
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The Problems of Interdisciplinarity profession. In this story, law distinguished itself by discarding its humanist, literary element, leaving a domain consisting almost entirely of rules.
And here is a final irony. For much of the American legal academy, this domain is functionally empty. Many have grown skeptical of legal doctrine's capacity to solve legal problems in a convincing way.1 Arguments about legal rules have been shown to fall into predictable patterns, with rule encountering counterrule or exception, policy encountering competing policy, text encountering legislative history, and so forth. " The rules are "in" there, all right, but they do not seem to be doing much to determine the outcome of cases.
If law's territory is a desert, the "law ands" can pour no end of water on it, but little will bloom. There is not much hope for interdisciplinarity and all that it promises if one of the disciplines is just not there. Like the proponents of other "law ands," the law-and-lits have a remarkable interest, then, in finding some substance in law, in law being a separate discipline that literature (or some other discipline that is not itself law) can somehow enlighten.
I do not in fact mean to suggest that the field "law" was created or constructed entirely by the needs of the "law and" endeavor-although I realize that what I have said could be interpreted in that manner. On the other hand, I do not believe law has determinate boundaries that comparisons with literature (or history or philosophy or economics) neutrally discover. I believe that the definition of the field "law," like that of any other field, will to some degree reflect or be a product of what we, as a culture, want law to be and do. 24 The greatest promise of "law and" lies in exploring these cultural aspirations, but it cannot deliver on this promise if it takes law's boundaries for granted.
